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INTERVENTIONS ABOUT EQUALITY IN 
SUPREME COURT CASES ABOUT 
COPYRIGHT LAW 
JESSICA SILBEY* 
This essay is adapted from a book I am writing called Against 
Progress: Intellectual Property and Fundamental Values in the Internet 
Age.1 The book’s primary argument is that, with the rise of digital 
technology and the ubiquity of the internet, intellectual property law is 
becoming a mainstream part of law and culture. Also, IP’s 
mainstreaming in the late-20th century exposes on-going debates about 
“progress of science and the useful arts,” which is the constitutional 
purpose of intellectual property rights.2 
Today, it is unexceptional to read about intellectual property law on 
the front page of mainstream newspapers or for intellectual property to 
be the subject of popular television shows.3  Intellectual property law is 
now a central part of legal education, with law schools building 
intellectual property and technology law research and advocacy centers 
to highlight the importance of the field in contemporary legal practice.4  
Moreover, since the mid-1990s, the United States Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari on intellectual property cases at a rate that is more 
 
*    Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law; Faculty Director, Center for 
Law, Innovation and Creativity (CLIC).  This essay is part of a larger project funded with a 
Guggenheim Fellowship in 2018. Many thanks to the organizers and participants of the 10th annual 
Supreme Court IP Review at Chicago-Kent College of Law and to the student editors of the Chicago-
Kent Journal of Intellectual Property. 
1. JESSICA SILBEY, AGAINST PROGRESS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FUNDAMENTAL VALUES IN THE INTERNET 
AGE (forthcoming 2021). 
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
3. See Silicon Valley: Seasons 1-6 (HBO television broadcast 2013-2019). 
4. See Steven Brachmann, The State of IP Education Worldwide: Seven Leading Nations, prepared 
for The Center for IP Understanding (2018), pp. 1, 3, available at 
https://www.understandingip.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/CIPU-State-of-IP-Education-
Worldwide-SB-BB.pdf. 
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than double previous decades.5 Intellectual property’s “domestication” 
into everyday legal and popular culture signals its probable reshaping 
and repurposing of the “progress” towards which intellectual property 
aims in ways that may be far afield from original foundations. 
In brief, Against Progress describes how in the 20th century 
intellectual property legal doctrine and scholarship focused on 
economic models of progress, which were framed in terms of wealth 
accumulation and market theories facilitating economic growth.6  The 
rise of digital technology that facilitates all sorts of copying at the turn of 
the century puts pressure on the anti-copying regulations defining 
intellectual property.  Combine this technological development with the 
focus on economic rationales and incentive-based reasons for exclusive 
rights, and federal intellectual property rights expand and broaden to 
regulate more of the behavior that technology enables. The result was an 
increase in the amount of intellectual property itself: more copyrighted 
works, more patents and more trademarks.7 
Despite expanding scope and the rise of “more” intellectual 
property, Against Progress demonstrates that turn-of-the century 
intellectual property practice challenges the “progress as more” 
paradigm.  Through various methodological interventions – close 
reading of cases, doctrinal analysis, and various qualitative empirical 
methods – Against Progress demonstrates how contemporary accounts 
of intellectual property are not primarily anchored by claims of “more” 
or in economic growth terms. Instead, creative and innovative practices 
 
5. See Mark P. McKenna, The Rehnquist Court and the Groundwork for Greater First Amendment 
Scrutiny of Intellectual Property, 21 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 11, 14-15 (2006) (counting cases from 1972 
to 2006). From 2006 to 2019, the Supreme Court’s IP case load has continued apace, with 26 patent 
cases, 12 copyright cases, and 10 trademark cases. 
6. For canonical writing on the economic roots of intellectual property, see generally WILLIAM 
LANDES AND RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003). 
7. For scholarship on problems of increasing scope in IP, see Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark P. McKenna, 
Claiming Design, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 123, 123-24 (2018); Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2202 (2016); Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
587, 587 (2008). I understand that trademarks are authorized not by the “progress” clause of the 
Constitution but by its Commerce Clause. But insofar as progress is measured by “more” in the 
twentieth century, more distinctiveness and more competition—trademark law’s hallmarks—are 
considered good things too. Trade secret and right of publicity are also relevant intellectual 
property doctrines that have expanded in scope over the past several decades. See generally 
JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD (2018) 
(tracing evolution of right of publicity as an expanded right of privacy through the twentieth 
century); Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When 
They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 493-96 (2010) 
(discussing evolution of trade secret law from common law to enactment of Uniform Trade Secret 
Act). Due to scope and time restraints, I have limited my analysis in the book largely to copyright, 
patent, and trademark. 
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(and disputes concerning them) revolve around adjacent values and 
principles central to our constitutional system such as equality, privacy, 
and community or general welfare. 
The founders of the United States and its Constitution understood 
intellectual property to achieve “progress of science and the useful arts” 
by granting authors and inventors durationally limited property-like 
rights in their writings and inventions.8 But contemporary 
conversations about creative and innovative practices reveal that 
exclusivity and property-like rights may degrade not develop 
community sustainability.9  In other words, property rights and the 
economic models that have sustained them are under critical scrutiny in 
the new century by everyday creators and innovators in light of our new 
digitally-enabled landscapes. Supplanting economic rights are other 
fundamental rights deeply rooted in our constitutional democracy but 
which, like economic models of sustainable markets, are also subject to 
reconfiguration in our digital age. Against Progress argues that twenty-
first century creativity and innovation and the intellectual property law 
that structures it are developing from the new human and digital 
networks of the 21st century, which are reinvigorating and reconfiguring 
twentieth-century social and political values for our internet age. These 
values, such as equality, privacy, and distributive justice, are central to 
human dignity and flourishing but have been largely absent from 
intellectual property policy.  The book describes these debates about 
intellectual property over these values as a bellwether of changing social 
justice needs in the internet age. 
In this short essay, I provide only two examples of the shifting 
narratives at play in intellectual property disputes that are refocusing 
concerns from economic resource allocation to fundamental values that 
ground the rule of law in the United States. These examples are drawn 
from the chapter on equality, which traces themes of equal treatment 
and substantive equality doctrine through intellectual property cases at 
the United States Supreme Court. The below discussion concerns two 
controversial copyright cases, but the chapter discusses cases about 
patent, trademark, and copyright law. 
 
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 8. 
9. For an early and by now canonical example of a critique of intellectual property rights and 
“Progress of Science and useful Arts,” see generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can 
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998). 
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I.     SUPREME COURT AND EQUALITY DOCTRINE 
When the Supreme Court started taking more intellectual property 
cases in the 1990s, their decisions were largely unanimous. Although 
some milestone decisions were contested and split (for example the 
case deciding the legality of the home video recorder was decided 5-410), 
most cases then and now were much less contentious than, for example, 
cases about criminal law, affirmative action, or federalism. These other 
constitutional questions exhibit deep ideological division on the Court 
about, e.g., the role of government in ameliorating social inequality 
based on race, sex, or sexual orientation.  To be sure, the Supreme Court 
is more often unanimous than divided on most issues it decides in the 
dwindling set of cases on which it grants certiorari.11 But with the 
contentious cases concerning the lawfulness of same-sex marriage, anti-
discrimination laws and their potential conflict with religious exercise, 
as examples,12 the relative unanimity of the justices concerning 
intellectual property regulation and its relation to the constitutional 
prerogative of “progress of science and the useful arts” is notable. 
As the Supreme Court’s intellectual property caseload grows, 
however, so does the level of disagreement among the justices.  The 
disagreements resonate (on the surface at least) with utilitarian and 
economic explanations of IP law and policy. Is the IP law at issue 
rationally related to achieving its goal of promoting fair competition 
(trademark law) and “progress of science and the useful arts” (copyright 
and patent law)?  Only upon closer look and comparison between cases, 
as one might compare texts by the same author tracing phrases, 
structure, and influences, does the ascendant priority and significance 
emerge of new values other than commercial policy and welfare as a 
measure of progress and a fair marketplace.  These other values reflect 
debates concerning the nature and purpose of equality. 
 
10. Sony Corp v. Universal Studios, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984). 
11. See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 
53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1219 (2012); Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme 
Court, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 769 (2015). 
12. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (deciding 5-4 that the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires both marriage licensing and recognition for same-sex couples); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc, 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (holding 5-4  that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act allows 
for-profit companies to deny contraception coverage to employees based on a religious objection); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding 5-4  that Equal Protection Clause does not 
prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions to further a compelling 
interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body). 
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When dissents or concurrences arise, at first disagreements appear 
to revolve around customary IP-specific concerns such as balancing 
exclusive rights with meaningful access to promote a notion of 
“progress” defined by more inventions and creativity. But dig further 
and this canon of IP-specific Supreme Court case law also debates the 
appropriate beneficiaries for legal entitlements, fair opportunities to 
those benefits, and the effect of access to and constraints on those 
benefits for community wellbeing. In other words, as with all statutes 
and constitutional interpretation, the Court fills the semantic gaps and 
ambiguities with its perspective on the history and policy of the subject 
as related to deeper contemporary socio-cultural themes and 
preoccupations.  We learn by studying the gap-filling that various 
dimensions of equality central to U.S. law and culture influence the 
Court’s intellectual property decisions and structure the Court’s 
growing disagreements in the intellectual property field. 
It is curious that equality concepts frame these decisions when 
equality’s rival, liberty, is more fundamentally related to intellectual 
property given its power to exclude and restrict. Freedom to do 
something, rather than equal treatment with regard to some activity, is 
often considered the crux of the intellectual property issue. Equality 
presupposes fair distribution or access that frustrates freedom – think 
of anti-discrimination laws that mandate access at the expense of the 
freedom of the person or entity seeking to discriminate. This kind of 
equality would significantly reduce the dominion an IP owner has over 
their work.  Indeed, until recent Supreme Court decisions from the first 
decade of the 21st century changed IP remedy rules,13 the dominant 
remedy for IP infringement was an injunction (prohibiting doing 
something). This reflects IP’s home in the field of property law, where 
remedies reflect and rely upon control and dominance over the more 
typical property asset – a car, a home, a bank account. By contrast, legal 
claims that result in money damages (often described as the “liability”), 
and not an injunction or specific performance to do something, are often 
associated with contracts (broken promises) and torts (accidents and 
injuries).14  Of course, remedial schemes may be mixed in law. For 
example, civil rights disputes include both injunctions and money 
 
13. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (holding by unanimous court that 
permanent injunctions should not always be issued when a patent has been violated and instead 
that traditional four-part test for injunctive relief applies in patent law). 
14. See generally Guido Calebresi and Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Louis Kaplow and Steven 
Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996). 
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damages: a prohibition on the unlawful activity going forward and 
compensation for the civil rights injury of the past.  In civil rights cases, 
we may understandably reject thinking of liberty and equality as 
forming a zero-sum relationship: is the right to be free from racial 
segregation a wrongful lack of freedom for the segregationist or a 
rightful benefit for the equality of those previously segregated?  But in 
some contemporary cases concerning the “right to discriminate” in 
public accommodations – for example refusing to bake a gay couple’s 
wedding cake – the liberty-equality trade-off has returned.15 
And this is true with the Supreme Court cases about intellectual 
property.  Once considered mere economic rights like property, the 
debate about how to allocate IP resources was as uncontentious as 
whether Congress can regulate the interstate dairy industry with its 
plenary power to regulate interstate commerce.16  Now, however, to 
read and understand Supreme Court cases about IP as debating 
something other than property, something instead akin to civil rights of 
equal dignity, we recognize in them deeply rooted and still contentious 
debates over segregation, discrimination, and freedom from the 
arbitrary and unaccountable will of others as a path towards 
egalitarianism. 
When these equality debates concern access for women to an all-
male school, for example, lawyers understand immediately the 
implication of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment.  The 
implication of the equal protection clause in these situations triggers 
recognizable and long-standing doctrinal analyses. 
When the law at issue is not drawn along so-called “suspect” or 
“quasi-suspect” lines, however, e.g., regarding categorizations of race, 
religion, or gender, the acceptable doctrinal analysis under the equal 
protection clause is deferential judicial review. The court’s job is to ask 
only if the distinction in the law is rationally related to some legitimate 
purpose showing deference to the legislative line-drawing and the 
democratic processes that gave rise to the legislation in the first 
instance.  What this means is that “equal protection of the laws” does not 
require that all people or entities be treated the same, only that likes be 
treated alike or that when they are not, a rational basis exist for 
 
15. See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (holding 
7-2 that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s conduct in evaluating a cake shop owner’s reasons 
for declining to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple violated the Free Exercise Clause but 
refraining from deciding whether Colorado’s public accommodation law requires the baker to treat 
the same-sex the same as an opposite-sex couple). 
16. See US v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1939). 
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differential treatment.17  This is the rule against arbitrariness.  When 
differential treatment is justified, the differences are just that; they do 
not impose status hierarchies or perpetuate abuses of power but instead 
are distinctions rationally relied upon to promote orderly economic 
relations. 
So, for example, when opticians are treated differently than 
ophthalmologists for the purposes of state licensing requirements, or 
when a federal law blesses “pure” dairy products but bans “impure” 
dairy products, we ask whether this differential treatment violates the 
presumptive rule of formal equality (all eye doctors or dairy products 
should be treated the same). 18 We ask whether differential treatment is 
justified by some rational basis.  Intellectual property regulations are 
considered to embody economic rights and policy and thus would fall 
under rational basis scrutiny. As such, the Court largely defers to the 
lines drawn by Congress promoting or limiting intellectual property as 
long as a hypothetical rational basis exists for the categories and the 
differential treatment at issue. 
Deference to the democratic legislative rational disappears when 
the law distinguishes on the basis of “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” 
categories, e.g., on the basis of race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, or 
gender.  In these circumstances, equality law developed to more strictly 
scrutinize democratic decision-making out of concern that democratic 
rule has failed a historically disadvantaged group for arbitrary reasons 
or is otherwise perpetuating long-standing and irrational prejudice that 
degrades people on the basis of class membership or identity. This 
“strict scrutiny” requires a court’s searching review of the legislative 
rationales to root out invidious discrimination,19 such as White 
Supremacy and misogyny, both which structure political, social, and 
economic institutions to keep people of color and women on the 
margins of power and opportunity.  In these cases, courts demand from 
lawmakers a higher justification for the law and the lines it draws. In 
doing so, courts look for the perpetuation of status hierarchies for their 
own sake in which differences are stigmatized as markers of 
 
17. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980). 
18. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (holding differential treatment of 
opticians from ophthalmologists is ordinary economic legislation and does not violate equal 
protection clause); cf. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 154 (holding that federal law banning impure 
dairy products from interstate commerce does not violate due process or equal protection). 
19. Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6-11 
(1976). 
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inferiority.20 The rightful disdain of caste systems in which hierarchies 
perpetuate humiliation and shame for those with relatively little power 
or status motivates this equal protection analysis. 
This equality reasoning originates with the dissent from the 
grotesque error in Plessy v. Ferguson, which upheld legally mandated 
racial segregation as a reflection of consensual custom instead of a 
humiliating and oppressive practice that implied the social inferiority of 
Black people.21 Plessy was later reversed and corrected in Brown v. 
Board of Education, which defines equality as freedom from legally 
sanctioned hierarchy and subordination that create “unacceptable 
degrees of control over the lives of others.”22  This reasoning, conjoining 
freedom and equality, also celebrates choice and consent of free and 
equal people as a measure of a just society. Ideally, just legal regimes 
facilitate free choice and mutual consent between otherwise 
independent actors, developing self-determination and equal dignity 
while avoiding unjust subordination. 
Two controversial copyright cases decided a decade apart exhibit 
these doctrinal strands of equal protection law. These cases are 
controversial because both extended and strengthened copyright 
protection against a backdrop of an expanding digital age in which the 
swelling scope of copyright threatens speech and behavior on the 
internet. They are also controversial because as opportunities for 
speech and creativity grow in the digital age, copyright law’s incentive 
rationale (that exclusivity is necessary to promote expression and its 
dissemination) is less persuasive when applied to the expanding 
breadth of works to which copyright law now pertains. Finally, the cases 
are controversial because of weak reasoning and fractured opinions 
that speak past each other.23  As I explain below, a better way to 
understand these cases is not as debating the scope of copyright law as 
 
20. “The evil involved in such arrangements is a comparative one: what is objectionable is being 
marked as inferior to others in a demeaning way. . . . [I]t is not the tasks themselves that members 
of lower casts are assigned to perform that are demeaning – they may be necessary tasks that 
someone has to perform in any society. The problem is that they are seen as beneath those in higher 
castes. The remedy in such cases is to abolish the social system that defines and upholds such 
distinctions between superior and inferior.” T.H. Scanlon, When Does Equality Matter?, 8 (2004). 
21. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana Law segregating train travel 
by race as consistent with the equal protection clause because it treats both black and white 
passengers the same). 
22. Scanlon, supra note 20, at 9. 
23. For critique of Eldred, see Pamela Samuelson, The Constitutional Law of Intellectual Property 
after Eldred v. Ashcroft, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 547, 547-550, n. 7) (2003) (citing others). For 
critique of Golan, see Howard B. Abrams, Eldred, Golan and Their Aftermath, 
60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 491 (2013). 
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a matter of ordinary economic policy, but instead about the role of 
equality between people regarding copyright’s burdens and 
beneficiaries, an increasingly relevant concern in the digital age when 
copying fuels the internet and copyright can restrict access. 
II.     FORMAL EQUALITY AND LIKES TREATED ALIKE: ELDRED V. ASHCROFT 
Eldred v. Ashcroft concerns the rationality of congressional 
legislation called the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (the CTEA), 
passed at the end of the decade that witnessed the birth of the internet 
and the world wide web.24  The CTEA extended the copyright term 
twenty years, from life of the author plus fifty years (as enacted in 1976), 
to life of the author plus seventy years.25 A central question in the case 
was whether Congress had a rational basis for adding the twenty years 
and, relatedly, whether the enlarged term could permissibly apply to 
existing and future copyrights alike.26 Justice Ginsburg, writing for seven 
members of the Court, held that Congress did have a rational basis for 
the twenty-year extension and for its equal application to both existing 
and future copyrights and copyright holders.27 
The controversy around Eldred centers largely on the fact that few 
people believe that twenty extra years of copyright protection adds any 
incentive to authors or owners to create or disseminate creative works, 
the primary reasons for which copyrights are granted.28 Those 
disbelieving the Court’s reasoning would be forgiven for their 
skepticism given that Disney Corporation led the lobbying push for this 
legislation in order to protect Mickey Mouse (in his earliest incarnation 
as Steamboat Willie) from falling into the public domain in 1998. Also, 
the legislation was sponsored by representative Sonny Bono, a man who 
became wealthy from the sales of his music.  But rather than dig into the 
legislative history to discern whether the evidence and factual record 
supported a finding of sufficient incentives for more than the Disney 
 
24. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193-94 (2003) (upholding the Copyright Term Extension Act 
(CTEA) of 1998, which amended the durational provisions of the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 
304 (1998)). 
25.  Id. 
26. Id. at 204, 231. 
27. Id. at 194. 
28. Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (stating that “the primary 
objective of copyright” is ‘“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”) (alteration in 
original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The 
economic philosophy behind the [Copyright] clause . . . is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of 
authors and inventors . . . .”). 
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Corporation and musical celebrities, the Court traveled its usual and 
customary path when considering the rationality of ordinary economic 
legislation. It deferred to Congress, the relevant democratic body, saying 
“it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue 
the Copyright Clause’s objectives” of promoting progress of science and 
the useful arts.29 
This is a correct statement of law and legal history. And, there was 
some evidence before Congress—albeit self-serving and exaggerated 
evidence—suggesting that the extension of copyright by twenty years 
would benefit authors and publishers and encourage both to invest in 
more creative work.30 Musicians such as Bob Dylan and Carlos Santana 
gave testimony before Congress that said an extra twenty years would  
“assur[e] . . . fair compensation for themselves and their heirs [and thus] 
was an incentive to create.”31  The Motion Picture Association of 
American, of which Disney is a member, said that copyright term 
extension would “provide copyright owners [by which the MPAA means 
their studio members] generally with the incentive to restore older 
works and further disseminate them to the public.”32  And Senator Orrin 
Hatch argued that given “increasing longevity and the trend toward 
rearing children later in life, [copyright term extension will] provide 
adequate protection for American creators and their heirs” otherwise 
the  “U. S. copyright term [will fail] to keep pace with the substantially 
increased commercial life of copyrighted works resulting from the rapid 
growth in communications media.”33 Even without such evidence, 
however, the Court properly exercises deferential judicial review of 
ordinary economic legislation when it presumes the existence of such 
facts and when there is no evidence of legislative irrationality (such as 
prejudice), the targeting a suspect class (race or gender), or the 
burdening of a fundamental right. In these exceptional cases, the Court 
would abandon deference and engage in strict scrutiny of the legislative 
purpose and effect.34 
 
29. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212. 
30. Id. at 255-257 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
31. Id. at 207 n.15. 
32. Id. at 207 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 105–452, at 4 (1998)) 
33. Id. at 207 n.14.  See also Brief for Motion Picture Association of America as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 14-20, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2002)  (arguing that films are 
fragile and restoration is expensive such that longer terms will incentivize more restoration by 
facilitating recuperation of investment in that restoration process). 
34. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980). Notably, Justice Breyer suggests the level 
of scrutiny should be more than rational basis because the copyright extension intrudes on speech 
and raises First Amendment concerns. Id. at 244. Were this position to have prevailed, the lack of 
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There was another complaint about Eldred aside from the absence 
of sufficient or rational basis for the twenty-year extension. The Court’s 
reasoning exposed the possibility of perpetual copyright protection 
which would violate the Constitution’s “limited times” provision in the 
IP clause: Congress has the power “to promote the progress of science 
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors 
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”35 If 
Congress could extend by twenty years both existing and future 
copyrights on the self-serving statement of certain wealthy copyright 
owners who had a seat at Congress’s table, what prevents Congress from 
extending copyright indefinitely through a series of incremental 
extensions over time (which is precisely what has happened to 
copyright beginning with the first 1790 statute, which granted a mere 
fourteen year term).36  To this, the Court majority had little to say except 
that what it (and Congress) were aiming for in its application to future 
and present copyright authors alike was “parity” and 
“evenhanded[ness].”37  This is where the equality rationale resurfaces in 
a surprising new formulation for intellectual property law. 
The majority held that “[i]n that 1998 legislation, as in all previous 
copyright term extensions, Congress placed existing and future 
copyrights in parity. In prescribing that alignment, we hold, Congress 
acted within its authority and did not transgress constitutional 
limitations.”38 Doing so, the Court sidestepped the perpetual copyright 
problem altogether, except to say that 70 years is not perpetual and 
perpetual copyright would violate the “limited times” provision. And it 
justified its retroactive application of the longer copyright term with the 
moral force of the value of “equal treatment.” As long as Congress acts 
to promote equality in the copyright field among existing and future 
copyright holders the same – or “alike,” “evenhandedly,” or “in parity” 
(however the Court describes the similar treatment) – the Court says it 
trusts congressional decision-making. Notably, Justice Breyer in his 
dissent accepts for the purposes of argument that “it is not ‘categorically 
 
evidentiary support that both existing and future copyright holders are incentivized by the twenty-
year extension might have doomed the Act. 
35. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198-99 (quoting CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8). 
36.  See STAFF OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th CONG., STUD. ON DURATION OF COPYRIGHT(Comm. 
Print  1957) (detailing extension of copyright term from 14 years for the first Copyright Act in 1790 
to 56 years as of 1957 (28 years plus a renewal term of 28 years)), 
https://www.copyright.gov/history/studies/study30.pdf.  The 1976 Act changed copyright term 
to life of the author plus fifty years. The CTEA extended it to life of the author plus seventy years. 
37. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 200, 208. 
38. Id. at 194. 
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beyond Congress’ authority’ to ‘exten[d] the duration of existing 
copyrights’ to achieve such parity.”39 
One could understand Justice Ginsburg’s majority decision in 
Eldred as about recognizing and protecting the class of copyright 
holders that deserve equal treatment to avoid a violation of bedrock 
formal equality law demanding that similarly situated people (and 
things) be treated the same. Indeed, long-standing copyright law from 
1903 prohibits discrimination among copyright holders, holding that 
“high” and “low” art are similarly situated with regard to the exclusive 
rights copyright law provides.40 Eldred may therefore be simply an 
extension of this century-old anti-discrimination principle.  Simply 
counting the number of times the Eldred opinion uses words 
synonymous with “equality” reveals the Court’s focus on similar 
treatment. The first paragraph ends with the sentence, “Congress 
provided for application of the enlarged terms to existing and future 
copyrights alike.”41 The third paragraph states again that “Congress 
placed existing and future copyrights in parity.”42 It then concluded by 
saying “[i]n prescribing that alignment, we hold, Congress acted within 
its authority.”43 The opinion repeats the words “alike,” “parity,” and 
“alignment” or “aligned” nearly a dozen times. If we add references to 
“matches,” “equity,” “harmony,” “evenhandedly,” and “same[ness],” 
which also pepper the decision, the prominence of equal protection 
thinking in this copyright opinion emerges clearly. 
Other than linguistic choices, Ginsburg focused on the individual 
authors themselves and their expectations for equal legal treatment. She 
insisted throughout the opinion that current copyright holders are 
reasonable to expect they will be treated like future copyright holders 
should new legal benefits arise, because that is what has always 
happened.44 She also explained that Congress’ extension of copyright 
terms ensures the equal treatment of American authors to foreign 
authors under the Berne Convention.45 Personalizing the equal 
 
39. Id. at 266 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
40. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a 
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of 
the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”). 
41. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193 (emphasis added). 
42. Id. at 194 (emphasis added). 
43. Id. (emphasis added). 
44. Id. at 200. 
45. Id. at 205-206 (“Congress sought to ensure that American authors would receive the same 
copyright protection in Europe as their European counterparts.”). 
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treatment—its present expectation and its future effect globally—
paints this case not about monetary incentives to create or disseminate 
creative work but about the dignity of equal treatment as a social value 
absent a good reason to deviate.  In other words, although the decision 
reads as the classic deference to congressional decision-making under 
Congress’ plenary powers concerning ordinary economic legislation, 
Ginsburg’s opinion evoked her continuing mission of equal treatment 
for persons under the law.  Writing for the majority, she could see no 
plausible reason to treat some copyright holders differently from 
others, be it current versus future copyright owners or American versus 
foreign copyright authors. This was in part because of the strength of 
similar treatment, or formal equality, as a constitutional value. 
But reliance on formal equality to govern the outcome of this case 
disregards the history of copyright legislation, its captured process 
subject to special interest lobbying, and the democratic principles of fair 
process and open institutions on which procedural fairness is based.  
The tortured history of special interest copyright legislation is well-
documented.46 Jessica Litman’s book Digital Copyright explains how U.S. 
copyright legislative reform has been led largely by the strong-copyright 
advocates: the big six movie studios (the MPAA), the music recording 
industry (the RIAA), and the text publishing industry (the Author’s 
Guild).47 Litman argues that captured legislative process concerning 
copyright helps an elite group of copyright holders and harms the 
everyday audience of copyright users and creators. (In today’s parlance 
we might call the beneficiaries of these legislative reforms “the one 
percent.”) This is a far cry from equal treatment, and it is camouflaged 
by democratic flag waiving. 
Litman warned that if the past legislative process is predictive of 
the future, copyright spoils will be only for the wealthy and powerful, 
and its predominant form of digital copyright (the majority of 
expression today) will suffocate the constitutional mandate for 
“progress of science and the useful arts” that requires wide distribution 
of and access to creative expression. Justice Breyer’s Eldred dissent does 
not mention this critical legislative history but does say that 
“congressional action under the Copyright/Patent Clause demonstrates 
 
46. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001) (providing history of the 1998 copyright legislation); 
BILL HERMAN, THE FIGHT OVER DIGITAL RIGHTS: THE POLITICS OF COPYRIGHT AND TECHNOLOGY (2014) 
(providing a history of the DMCA, the CTEA and SOPA/PIPA in particular). 
47. Litman, supra note 46.  See also ARAM SINNREICH, THE PIRACY CRUSADE: HOW THE MUSIC INDUSTRY’S 
WAR ON SHARING DESTROYS MARKETS AND ERODES CIVIL LIBERTIES (2013). 
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that history . . . does not provide the ‘volume of logic,’ necessary to 
sustain the . . . [Act’s] constitutionality.”48 Indeed, as both dissents 
explain, the formal equality logic of equal treatment appears to be a ruse 
benefitting only 2% of copyright holders. Those beneficiaries’ estates 
may profit 50 years after the author’s death from the extended copyright 
term, but it is manifestly unlikely the extra years of copyright did or will 
incentivize the production or further dissemination of the creative work 
produced.49 
In this light, the equal treatment justification for the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act melts away. As it turns out, very few 
people actually supported the CTEA. It was a compromise struck by 
digital platform intermediaries, building their commercial presence on 
the internet, and content companies, such as the MPAA and the RIAA, 
whose copyright assets traveled farthest and fastest on those digital 
networks. In exchange for agreeing to the twenty year copyright term 
extension, the digital intermediaries received immunity for certain 
kinds of unauthorized uses on-line pursuant to a law passed later the 
same year called the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (the DMCA). 
The motivation for record companies and music publishers was 
clear enough; the former wanted to reduce the number of illicit 
digital copies competing with their official recordings, and the 
latter wanted another source of licensing revenues. Technology 
companies supported the bill – not on principle, but because they 
wanted to design and sell their products without being sued.50 
The result of a captured legislative process is copyright law that 
entrenches moneyed interests.51 Far from treating people the same, the 
CTEA (and its sibling the DMCA) was a backroom deal later justified by 
the Court as democratic and reflecting equal treatment. 
Justice Stevens’ dissent is most vocal on this score, and Justice 
Breyer adopts the reasoning in full. Justice Stevens’ critique of the parity 
argument shifts focus of equal treatment from the class of “authors” 
seeking to protect their copyright (content owners, such as the MPAA) 
to the public that the Copyright Act was intended to ultimately benefit. 
“Ex post facto extensions of copyrights result in a gratuitous transfer of 
wealth from the public to authors, publishers and their successors in 
interest. Such retroactive extensions do not even arguably serve either 
the purposes of the Copyright/Patent Clause,” which he explained is “to 
 
48. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 233. 
49. Id. at 248. 
50. Herman, supra note 46, at 35. 
51. Id. at 48-52. 
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allow the public access to products of [author’s creative activity] after 
the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”52 And later Justice 
Stevens says: 
the reason for increasing the inducement to create something 
new simply does not apply to an already-created work. To the 
contrary, the equity argument actually provides strong support 
for petitioners. Members of the public were entitled to rely on a 
promised access to copyrighted or patented works at the 
expiration of the terms specified when the exclusive privileges 
were granted. On the other hand, authors will receive the full 
benefit of the exclusive terms that were promised as an 
inducement to their creativity, and have no equitable claim to 
increased compensation for doing nothing more.53 
Stevens unravels the majority’s parity argument with an expanded 
focus on all the beneficiaries of the Copyright Act, demonstrating how 
formal equality logic of equal treatment can be easily manipulated by 
narrowing the relevant class. Treating “likes alike” – “all” “authors” the 
same, in Ginsburg’s argument – ignores all those other people for whom 
copyright also exists as well as the flaws in democratic process that 
established the benefit. The equal treatment argument thereby 
perpetuates the exclusion of a vast public who should be included within 
the Act’s application of parity, or, as Breyer names them: “movie buffs 
and aging jazz fans, . . . historians, scholars, teachers, writers, artists, 
database operators, and researchers of all kinds . . .who want to make 
the past accessible for their own use or for that of others.”54  The 
dissents’ identification of flaws in the underlying justification for the 
majority’s equality rationale articulates additional interests for IP’s 
constitutional implementation: a public and the public domain. The 
dissents do not reject equality as critical to copyright law’s structure, 
but instead redraws the lines of class membership and asks explicitly: 
who else counts when considering equal treatment? 
As the dissents explain, the category of “authors” varies to whom 
the twenty-year extension applies. Most authors – 98% of them 
according to the dissent’s calculation based on briefs filed in the case – 
would not materially benefit from the legislation.  And future or aspiring 
authors who rely on previous work on which to create new works will 
 
52. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 227. 
53. Id. at 244 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Breyer reiterates this point: “Copyright statutes must serve 
public, not private, ends; . . .  they must seek ‘to promote the Progress’ of knowledge and learning; 
and . . .  they must do so both by creating incentives for authors to produce and by removing the 
related restrictions on dissemination after expiration . . . .” Id. at 247-48 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
54. Id. at 250, (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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be hindered by the extended monopoly. The dissents presage in 2003 
how today, decades later, the category of authors to whom the equality 
principle should apply continues to expand and be even more relevant 
to human relations and productivity in the digital era.55 For example, in 
2011, when the Stop On-Line Piracy Act (SOPA) was being debated, 
which law had it passed would have strengthened law enforcement 
tools to combat online copyright infringement including blocking user 
internet access, a successful grassroots movement of everyday internet 
users, authors, creators, and innovators, shut down the internet for a 
day in protest demonstrating their criticality and their power.56  
Movements like this emphasize that authors are not only those who 
succeed at earning royalties in exchange for licensed use by established 
intermediaries (a very small class of lucky authors). In the internet age 
especially, authors are everyday creators and users – or “prosumers” to 
borrow Alvin Toffler’s coinage – who depend on access to the vast trove 
of expressive works newly accessible from our digital networks in order 
to produce and participate in our dynamic and industrious culture.57  As 
the Eldred dissents explain, the majority failed to consider these other 
copyright stakeholders despite basing its decision on the value of 
inclusivity. 
As civil rights advocates understand, there is much to criticize 
about equality jurisprudence that mechanically recites the benefit of 
“equal treatment” without investigating more deeply the relevant 
categories of people or things being compared.58  The just application of 
formal equality often depends on carefully defining the category of 
membership and identifying a starting line to which everyone has the 
same access in order to evaluate relevant progress.  Justice Ginsburg is 
no stranger to this critique given her role in gender and racial equality 
 
55. See Amy Goodman, The SOPA Blackout Protest Makes History, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2012), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/jan/18/sopa-blackout-protest-
makes-history (“An unprecedented wave of online opposition to the SOPA and PIPA bills before 
Congress shows the power of a free internet.”). 
56. BILL HERMAN, THE FIGHT OVER DIGITAL RIGHTS: THE POLITICS OF COPYRIGHT AND TECHNOLOGY 194 
(2013). 
57. ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE 27 (1980). See also DON TAPSCOTT, THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 62 
(1995); George Ritzer & Nathan Jurgenson, Production, Consumption, Prosumption: The Nature of 
Capitalism in the Age of the Digital ‘Prosumer’, 10 J. CONSUMER CULTURE 13, 17 (2010). 
58. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 219 (1989) (describing how 
law and society subordinate women to men by defining women as different and thus justifying their 
unequal treatment, or by measuring women by male standards and thus justifying women’s 
subordination when they don’t match up) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory]. See 
also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 123 (1987) 
[hereinafter MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified]. 
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cases concerning accommodation and affirmative action that 
interrogate inequality as a function of disparate origins and inattention 
to their relevant differences. But she fails to see its purchase here.  
Nonetheless, the debate between the majority and dissents in Eldred 
concerning equal treatment illuminates new stakes on which the 
argument about IP’s structure and purpose proceeds in the digital age. 
III.     ANTI-HIERARCHY, ANTI-CASTE: GOLAN V. HOLDER. 
This section discusses the Supreme Court case Golan v. Holder as an 
example of equality law grounded not in the equal treatment principle 
but in the anti-subordination principle. Formal equality or “equal 
treatment” is only one aspect of equality analysis. Critical to equality law 
is the consideration of social circumstances, opportunities, or freedoms 
that are thwarted because not all are treated or created the same, which 
may justify disparate treatment. Cases like Golan demonstrate this 
layered equality jurisprudence by moving from an equal treatment 
analysis to concern over status hierarchies and denigrating castes in the 
context of intellectual property disputes that justify special 
accommodation or affirmative action.  Golan v. Holder rejects a formal 
equality analysis (“all authors”) and looks instead to promoting equality 
by treating some authors differently (“foreign authors” alone) to undo 
the injustice of prior differential treatment or subordination. 
Despite attention to unjust subordination, the effect of the Court’s 
analysis is to reinstate property relations or a social system that 
oppresses people not present to protect their stake in the IP dispute. I 
argue that this demonstrates the court’s inadequate attention to the 
internet’s complex integration of social relations and economic 
opportunities, a feature of our networked age that magnifies both 
opportunities and deprivations.  Cases like Golan debating the benefits 
of IP law show how the interconnectedness of economic and social 
policy in the digital age complicates and requires clarification of the 
responsibilities we have to each other in terms of “the social conditions 
of freedoms . . . need[ed] to function as equal citizens.”59  And yet the 
Court’s unrequited paean to anti-subordination equality moved the 
debate from market economics to deeply held values of equal dignity 
and reflects the centrality of current cultural debates about persistent 
inequality and solutions to it in the new era of the internet. When, as the 
Golan court explains, past IP rights or limitations are stigmatic markers 
 
59. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point of Equality, 109 ETHICS, 287, 320 (1999). 
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of inferiority, or when they perpetuated caste-like conditions (the way 
race was understood in Brown v. Board of Education), the Court 
reorients its analysis from IP being about ordinary economic legislation 
to one about identity, personhood, and belonging in a complex 
ecosystem aiming to promote creative expression and sustaining 
collaborations. 
The 2012 decision of Golan v. Holder upholds as constitutional 
section 104A of the U.S. Copyright Act, added in 1994 as part of the U.S. 
joining the international Berne treaty (the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works). Section 104A grants 
copyright protection to certain preexisting works of Berne member 
countries previously in the public domain in the U.S. These foreign 
works lacked U.S. copyright protection and were in the U.S. public 
domain because either the U.S. did not protect works from that country 
at the time of their publication or because authors of those works failed 
to comply with U.S. statutory requirements. Section 104A’s effect was to 
withdraw hundreds of thousands of works from the U.S. public 
domain—canonical works such as Prokofiev’s “Peter and the Wolf” and 
Edward Munch’s painting “The Scream”—and bring them under U.S. 
copyright protection for the remaining portion of their exclusive term. 
  Many advocates considered section 104A’s shrinking of the public 
domain—on which innumerable people rely for education, 
entertainment, and commerce—a First Amendment violation and 
beyond Congress’ power under the intellectual property clause. The 
petitioners in Golan argued that “[r]emoving works from the public 
domain . . . violates the ‘limited [t]imes’ restriction by turning a fixed 
and predictable period into one that can be reset or resurrected at any 
time, even after it expires.”60 This shrinking of the public domain 
presented new challenges to freedom of speech. Those opposed to 
section 104A drew on the Supreme Court’s statement a decade earlier 
in Eldred, that altering the “traditional contours of copyright protection” 
warrants heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment.61  
Heightened scrutiny, sometimes in the form of strict scrutiny, means a 
court demands more than a rational justification for the law. Democratic 
deference and mere rationality no longer apply when a fundamental 
right is at stake. In other words, the Golan petitioners learned their 
lesson from the Eldred court’s submissiveness to congressional line-
 
60.Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 203, 318-19 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
61.Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
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drawing for ordinary economic policy issues.  If the Court defers only to 
Congress’s ordinary copyright legislation based in economic policy, 
Petitioners must show how 104A is extraordinary legislation because it 
interferes with the fundamental right of free speech. As such, Congress 
would have to justify 104A’s copyright extension with a more rigorous 
record of its purported benefits to creative production and 
dissemination, a challenge the petitioners thought Congress could not 
meet. 
But Petitioners focused on the wrong fundamental right. In Golan, 
as in Eldred, the Court is not worried about free speech but about 
equality. Instead of analyzing the law’s balance of producing more 
creative work despite substantially shrinking the public domain, the 
Court considers the new equality as justification. The decision begins 
with familiar language about formal equality – “sameness” and 
“reciprocity” – stating that Section 104A gave to foreign works “the 
same full term of protection available to U.S. works” because 
“[m]embers of the Berne Union agree to treat authors from other 
member countries as well as they treat their own.”62 Justice Ginsburg, 
for the majority, understands the United States’ acquiescence to Berne 
as a “reciprocat[ion] with respect to . . . authors’ works.”63  The Court 
considers the laudable effect of section 104A, despite its diminution of 
the public domain, as a “restoration plac[ing] foreign works on an equal 
footing with their U.S. counterparts.”64 
But the Golan decision goes beyond formal equality of treating likes 
alike and reasons to its result by relying on an anti-subordination 
principle. The anti-subordination principle is sometimes understood as 
competing with anti-classification (or formal) equality.65 Commitment 
to anti-subordination reflects a belief that certain distinctions 
reproduce or enforce inferior social status, especially of historically 
oppressed people. As Reva Siegel and Jack Balkin write, 
“[a]ntisubordination theori[es] contend that guarantees of equal 
citizenship cannot be realized under conditions of pervasive social 
stratification and argue that law should reform institutions and 
practices that enforce the secondary social status of historically 
 
62. Golan, 565 U.S. at 308. 
63. Id. at 312. 
64. Id. at 315. 
65. Reva Siegel, Equality Talk: Anti-subordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional 
Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472-73 (2004). 
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oppressed groups.”66 The anti-subordination rationale, in contrast to 
the anti-classification or formal equality principle, allows—and even 
encourages—the government to prefer or benefit some groups over 
others to remedy past conditions of subordination or deprivation. 
Rather than rely on concepts of “sameness” and “difference” for which 
relevant differences justify different treatment, an anti-subordination 
rationale excoriates the existence and perpetuation of hierarchy that 
reinforce both privilege and stigma and justifies treating people 
differently to undo such injustices. The Supreme Court’s equality 
jurisprudence embraces both anti-subordination equality (affirmative 
action) as well as anti-discrimination equality (equal treatment).  These 
doctrines co-originated after the Civil War when the Freedman’s bureau 
provided benefits only to newly freed slaves at the same time as the new 
Fourteenth Amendment insisted on a new norm of “equal protection of 
the laws.” Constitutional approval of affirmative action has extended 
into the 20th century with programs in education and employment that 
aim to remediate systemic discrimination and disadvantage by selecting 
for and protecting only certain statuses and physical traits historically 
targeted, such as race, sex, pregnancy and able-bodiedness. 
Consider the case of gender inequality. Under the formal equality 
model, women and men are both persons and thus equal, e.g., “the same” 
and should be judged by the same criteria, for example when applying 
for jobs.67 Conversely, they may also be “different” in some capacity and 
thus need not be treated the same, for example when assessing leave 
after a child is born.68 Neither approach considers how gender as a social 
category constrains or provides opportunities for and access to social, 
political and economic benefits on the basis of sex.69 Job criteria may be 
the same, but fewer women may be hired because they experience less 
access to opportunities that prepare them for the job market because of 
gender stereotyping and differential social roles (of child care or career 
expectations). Similarly, providing more leave for women after child 
birth may make sense because their physical experience of child birth 
may require more recovery time, but granting more time to women than 
to men may encourage more mothers to stay home with newborns than 
 
66. Siegel & Jack Balkin, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or 
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2004). 
67. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, supra note 58, at 33; see also MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist 
Theory, supra note 58, at 219. 
68. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, supra note 58, at 33; see also MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist 
Theory, supra note 58, at 219. 
69. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, supra note 58, at 34-39. 
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fathers and discourage equal parenting and equal opportunity to return 
to and advance at work.  “Same” or “different” treatment without regard 
to existing gendered social stratification and the reasons for it 
reproduces inequality through powerful male-dominated institutions 
(the paid workforce) at the expense of women. By contrast, an anti-
subordination approach to gender inequality identifies the power 
instantiated in the labels “male” and “female,” and asks whether the 
maintenance of the labels “participates in the systemic social 
deprivation of one sex because of sex.”70  As Catherine MacKinnon has 
written regarding this form of equality theory: 
The only question [for equality] . . . is whether the policy or 
practice in question integrally contributes to the maintenance of 
an underclass or a deprived position because of gender 
status . . . . The social problem addressed is not the failure to 
ignore woman’s essential sameness with man, but the 
recognition of womanhood to women’s comparative 
disadvantage.71 
What does this have to do with the Golan decision and copyright 
law? As literary historians and copyright scholars recount, the U.S. 
copyright system was rigged against foreign authors from its earliest 
days on behalf of the American publishing industry.72 Foreign authors 
were disadvantaged as compared to domestic authors regarding 
copyright.  U.S. copyright was riddled with technical traps unfamiliar to 
foreign authors. U.S. copyright law in large part failed to protect foreign 
authors (who first published oversees) who sought to publish and sell 
their works in the United States. This led to profound imbalances in the 
U.S. of the relative cost of works by foreign and domestic authors; 
foreign works were cheap to publish because copyright licenses were 
not required. These purposeful market asymmetries skewed the 
perceived value of, and access to, foreign and domestic works. Foreign 
authors were the “women” in this social hierarchy of access to economic 
independence and career opportunities.  Section 104A was enacted by 
Congress to remedy those imbalances – only for foreign authors. It was 
enacted, according to Ginsburg’s majority opinion, as affirmative action 
 
70. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 
102, 117-118 (1979). 
71. Id. at 117. 
72. ROBERT SPOO, WITHOUT COPYRIGHTS: PIRACY, PUBLISHING AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 2, 70 (2013); MARK 
ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 17 (1993). 
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to undo or reverse the harm caused by decades of copyright deprivation 
for foreign authors and overseas copyright holders.73 
According to the Golan majority, fixing the anti-foreign bias in the 
U.S. copyright system by reserving benefits only for formerly deprived 
foreign authors is justified for two reasons: international harmonization 
assures better treatment to U.S. authors abroad and it is a targeted 
remedy for the purposeful deprivation of foreign authors’ copyright by 
restoring their exclusive rights in the United States. Section 104A did in 
fact harmonize the U.S. copyright regime by placing foreign works in the 
position they would have occupied if the current non-discriminatory 
U.S. regime had been in effect when those works were created and first 
published. As the Court states, “[a]uthors once deprived of protection 
are spared the continuing effects of that initial deprivation; [section 
104A] gives them nothing more than the benefit of their labors during 
whatever time remains before the normal copyright term expires.”74  
Restoring works to the “position they would have occupied” and 
“spar[ing]” authors any further “deprivation” unmistakably resonates 
with the language of affirmative action and remedying past unjust 
discrimination.75 Indeed, in a footnote, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion 
accuses the unreformed copyright law (and Justice Breyer’s dissent) of 
American exceptionalism and isolationism, a critique resonating with 
concerns of cultural dominance (status and stigma) that animate anti-
subordination equality theory.76 
The Golan majority further argues that restoration of copyright and 
a focused shrinking of the public domain is a modest reform. Far from 
making foreign authors whole (it does not add all the years they lost), it 
raises those “deprived” foreign authors to the current status of the U.S. 
authors.77 Like the affirmative action doctrine in the gender or race 
context, the bestowed “benefit” on the select class—here, copyright of 
foreign works whose protection was unavailable under the older 
regime—is something that should have previously been conferred, but 
 
73. Supreme Court affirmative action jurisprudence in the context of race began in 1976 (with 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)) and with gender arguably not until 1996 
(with the decision of U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).  There has never been a Supreme Court 
decision evaluating a gender-based affirmative action plan. U.S. v. Virginia concerned the level of 
judicial scrutiny for equality violations on the basis of gender (VMI did not allow women to enroll), 
which would also apply to programs that afforded affirmative action to women. See Virginia, 518 
U.S. at 530-31. 
74.  Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 334 (2012). 
75.  Id. 
76. Id. at 327 n.28. 
77. Id. at 333. 
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was otherwise unlawfully or wrongfully withheld. The wrong was the 
denial of copyright to foreign authors not because they failed standards 
of merit or creativity but to benefit U.S. authors by providing them with 
market leverage. Foreign authors were unrepresented in the U.S. 
legislative process and thus their denial of copyright that enriched the 
purse of U.S. authors without any obvious connection to copyright law’s 
goals of promoting the creation and dissemination of creative work 
smacks of abuse of power. 
Of course, there were benefits to the deluge of uncopyrighted 
works by foreign authors into the U.S. public domain. Those works could 
be disseminated without license, making them cheaper and more 
available to readers (albeit without remuneration to the original 
authors). Some say this fact alone explains the prevalence of the 
modernist authors from Europe in the U.S. public school curricula for 
much of the 20th century.78 Would we have read James Joyce in the 
volume we did had the books not been so inexpensive to reproduce and 
disseminate? Breyer’s dissent in Golan develops this theme, focusing on 
the public domain’s indispensability to education and national culture.79 
He also critiques as unfounded and irrational the majority’s argument 
that the remediation of the lost copyright and harmonization of both 
foreign and domestic rights “promotes the diffusion of knowledge” (a 
copyright goal) by incentivizing the republication and restoration of 
those works “lost” to the public domain. 80  The dissent argues that 
revived copyright for these foreign authors will not promote more of 
them or their wider distribution. Indeed, there is recent empirical 
evidence that supports this assertion.81 Copyright might disappear all 
but the best sellers, leaving the majority of books invisible to the public 
until they become public domain material.82 This is an argument that 
 
78. Spoo, supra note 72, at 158-159. Spoo writes about how obscenity law at this time severely 
hampered the publishing industry especially when the modernists were writing novels and poems 
and short stories with “dirty” words and erotic content. See id. at 182-183. Some obscenity laws 
were enforced through the postal service – declaring manuscripts “nonmailable.” Id. Spoo suggests 
the “absence of copyright registration records for issues of The Little Review [which contained 
many of the early works of Joyce] may be the direct result of the post office’s obscenity 
suppressions. Nonmailable issues could not readily have been deposited in the Copyright Office. 
Once the magazine had acquired the stigma of obscenity, moreover, the register of copyrights has 
a plausible ground for effusing to register claims of copyright in the issues . . . .” Id. 
79. Golan, 565 U.S. at 354. 
80. Id. at 345. 
81. Imke Reimers, Copyright and Generic Entry in Book Publishing, 11 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 
1, 2 (2019) (showing that copyright expiration promoted the works availability); Paul Heald, How 
Copyright Keeps Works Disappeared, 11 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 829, 830 (2014). 
82. Heald, supra note 81, at 830. 
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104A’s restoration or affirmative action does more harm than good 
from a copyright perspective and that attention should be paid when 
protecting status and erasing stigma anchor IP policy, which is typically 
geared to progressing economic and cultural production. 
The Golan majority decisively rejects the public domain benefits of 
the U.S. copyright regime that left so many foreign works unprotected 
because, the Court argued, equality is worth the costs to users. In 
making this argument, the majority analogizes to a well-understood 
equality harm of pay discrimination: 
The question here . . . is whether would-be users must pay for 
their desired use of the author’s expression, or else limit their 
exploitation to “fair use” of that work. Prokofiev’s Peter and the 
Wolf could once be performed free of charge; after §514 [Section 
104A] the right to perform it must be obtained in the 
marketplace. This is the same marketplace, of course, that exists 
for the music of Prokofiev’s U.S. contemporaries: works of 
Copland and Bernstein, for example, that enjoy copyright 
protection, but nevertheless appear regularly in the programs of 
U.S. concertgoers.83 
This analogy resonates with the rhetoric of “equal pay for equal 
work,” the slogan used for the Equal Pay Act of 1963 that continues to 
be marshaled in support of the Paycheck Fairness Act, first introduced 
in 1997 and re-introduced every two years since but never passed.  On 
the surface, Justice Ginsburg’s reasoning for the Golan majority makes 
sense: why value Copland’s work higher than Prokofiev’s? If there is no 
difference between the works by copyright standards, why must one be 
paid for while the other is free?  Absence of a rational basis leaves open 
the possibility of irrational or invidious purposes. And indeed, Justice 
Ginsburg critiques the unreformed U.S. copyright law as xenophobic and 
U.S.-centric that purposely devalues and excludes foreign works in 
order enrich national authors. To her, there is no good justification for 
the stigmatic and material harm arising from this scheme. 
But contrary to equal pay laws, which have no losers except the 
employers for whom antidiscrimination policies may be expensive, the 
dissent in Golan argues that section 104A causes real harm to a diffuse 
and vulnerable public. Those who rely on the stability and existence of 
public domain material, such as educators, researchers, fledgling artists 
and authors, are now forced to pay where they had not previously. The 
Golan majority and dissent dispute the relevance and importance of the 
 
83. Golan, 565 U.S. at 333; but see Spoo, supra note 72, at 143, 303 n.148 (questioning whether 
American authors were held back by European competition). 
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public domain to cultural production, expressive freedoms and 
community development, that is, to “progress” writ large. The dissent 
claims the public domain is a resource relied upon as of right with 
constitutional importance. As previously mentioned, some literary and 
legal scholars have argued that the U.S. publishing industry’s “piracy” of 
European works shaped the American and European literary culture. 
Without the “burden” of copyright protection, foreign authors such as 
James Joyce, Ezra Pound, Djuna Barnes and even Gilbert and Sullivan 
evaded U.S. government censors and enriched their celebrity through 
lower prices and saturated U.S. markets, which led the global market for 
these works.84 Because many of these works were intellectually 
challenging or even obtuse to American readership, their prevalence in 
the U.S. marketplace given their affordability and lack of regulation very 
likely facilitated widespread acceptance and celebration.  Whether this 
justifies the “subordination” of foreign authors to U.S. authors is an 
important question the decision does not address. This is because the 
majority describes the U.S. public domain as “unowned” and thus less 
protected or important than personal property such as copyright and 
thereby easily elevates equality and anti-subordination as the 
predominate concerns.85 When there is no public good at stake other 
than that produced by copyright ownership per the majority opinion, 
equality concerns with regard to that ownership can take priority. 
The majority’s equal pay argument is laudable in the context of pay 
discrimination cases in which similarly situated workers are paid less 
because of irrelevant differences (such as gender or race). But in the 
copyright context this argument speaks past the dissent’s concern that 
the public domain be constant or growing and that shrinking the public 
domain thwarts copyright’s goals of “progress” measured by access to 
expressive works and opportunities for creative production.  The 
majority’s argument assumes a financial benefit exists for authors 
whose copyright revives under 104A, which may encourage further 
publication and dissemination of those works. To the dissent and many 
commentators, this position is laughable. For the most part, works not 
under copyright disseminate freely and are accessible.86 By contrast, 
works once in the public domain and now under copyright due to Golan 
may be stalled from dissemination and republication precisely because 
permission is now required and may be expensive. The majority and 
 
84. Robert Spoo, Ezra Pound’s Copyright Statute, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1775, 1817 (2009). 
85. See Golan, 565 U.S. at 325 n.26, 331. 
86. Heald, supra note 81, at 855. 
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dissent are debating what “progress” means in this case: equal status 
under copyright law (but without a guarantee of remuneration) or a 
stable and nurtured public domain, even if that comes at a loss of control 
to copyright owners. 
Golan majority’s unconvincing reliance on copyright’s financial 
benefit to justify foreign copyright restoration belies its true focus, 
which is the dignity deprived European authors by being excluded from 
the legal regime of authorial control.87  Foreign authors who lacked U.S. 
copyright and sought to be published in the U.S. with some hope of 
copyright-like revenue had to devise creative business solutions. Some 
issued alternative versions of their work so “first publication” of this 
“new” work would in fact be in the U.S.88 Others struck precarious 
publishing deals on a handshake without the enforceability of law. 
These additional hurdles required for foreign authors simply to 
participate in the same market as U.S. authors was insulting and 
degrading. Working twice has hard for less control or pay is a 
professional affront in other contexts (such as gender or race 
discrimination situations). Indeed, authors such as James Joyce, Ezra 
Pound, and T.S. Eliot were vocal and organized around the unfairness of 
U.S. copyright law to non-U.S. authors and fought the system to control 
the form and manner in which their work was published and 
disseminated in the U.S.89  These and other authors signed Joyce’s 
“protest” accusing certain American publishers of being “get-rich-quick 
promoter[s]” by benefitting from “the innocent connivance of American 
law.”90 The Golan majority echoes these sentiments without dwelling on 
the literary characters or history and draws on the general 
characterization of dignity harms foreign authors experience from the 
earlier U.S. copyright regime. 
In other contexts, the harm of anti-subordination is obvious. 
Women who cook do so as wives and mothers without pay, men who 
cook do so as chefs to fame and fortune. Men are doctors and women are 
nurses, where the former is high paying and provides more autonomy 
and prestige.91 There is nothing inherently “beneath” a person to do 
 
87. Wendy J. Gordon, Dissemination Must Serve Authors: How the U.S. Supreme Court Erred, 10 REV. 
OF ECON. RES. COPYRIGHT ISSUES 1, 4 (2013). 
88. Spoo, supra note 78, at 74, 280 n.10. 
89. Id. at 116-153 (detailing Ezra Pound’s legal battles against US copyright law). 
90. Id. at 168, 186. 
91. Where the opposite is true and doctors are predominantly women, as in Russia, being a 
physician is not as prestigious or well-paying a job. See, e.g., Aditi Ramakrishnan et al., Women’s 
Participation in the Medical Profession: Insights from Experiences in Japan, Scandinavia, Russia and 
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laundry and change bed linen – it is likely the vast majority of us do it – 
but over centuries those who have done so for others are perceived to 
be part of an underclass as maids, servants, or even as enslaved persons. 
The evil involved in such arrangements is a comparative one: 
what is objectionable is being marked as inferior to others in a 
demeaning way. . . . [I]t is not the tasks themselves that members 
of lower casts are assigned to perform that are demeaning – they 
may be necessary tasks that someone has to perform in any 
society. The problem is that they are seen as beneath those in 
higher castes. The remedy in such cases is to abolish the social 
system that defines and upholds such distinctions between 
superior and inferior.92 
The identity and status of “author” is subject to the same structural 
analysis: when are authors valued as “authors” under copyright and 
when are they excluded despite doing the same work as legal authors? 
The Golan majority and other Supreme Court opinions from the recent 
past appear to draw on this equality critique, identifying unjust 
hierarchies in the distribution of IP benefits and burdens anchored in 
status and subordination. Their underlying effect is to elevate the status 
of authorship in the digital age worthy of this values-based critique. But 
doing so without concern for critical function of the public domain for 
all people, especially subsequent and developing authors who rely on 
the public domain, may miss an opportunity for larger structural reform. 
When amplifying anti-subordination causes, it is often too easy to 
reinstate property relations that oppress those not present to protect 
their equity stakes and social status. This was the case in Golan 
regarding all who routinely rely on the public domain. This is especially 
problematic given the internet’s integration of social relations and 
economic opportunities; failing to account for absent and diffuse 
stakeholders who rely on access to the public domain that is vastly 
improved by the digital era doubly oppresses them in today’s 
networked society.  The majority’s copyright bean-counting solution – 
simply give more copyright to more people to undo the subordination – 
triggers the dissent’s response that the public domain has value too.  
Fair enough, but that imagines the copyright pie as a zero-sum resource, 
balancing allocations like a finite amount on a scale.  But that is not how 
copyright works. It is not how anti-subordination equality works either.  
 
Eastern Europe, 23 J. Women’s Health 927, 930 (2014) (describing how women are a majority of 
physicians in the former USSR, and the prestige of the profession declined and was one of the 
poorest-paid professional occupations. “Simultaneously, women were encouraged to work as 
physicians in this new landscape, resulting in the feminization of the profession.”). 
92. Scanlon, supra note 20, at 8. 
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Describing copyright exclusivity and the public domain as opposites of 
the IP coin leaves the public domain as copyright’s negative as opposed 
to a fundamental baseline of all intellectual property regimes.93 A 
different solution to those injured by the unreformed copyright law 
would have been reparations to the injured class paid for by those who 
became rich from the free works and also a declaration requiring fair 
treatment going forward. Shrinking the public domain and hurting all 
who rely on it to pay for past injuries to authors aggrieved by the public 
domain’s fecundity is affirmative action that perpetuates the injury of 
exclusivity and hierarchy under the guise of inclusivity and equality. 
The risk that affirmative action aiming to undue past unjust 
discrimination may paradoxically perpetuate inequality of status and 
opportunity is the reason the Supreme Court strictly reviews such plans 
when they are based on race and gender.  When they are based on 
copyright, however, as the legislation in Golan was, the Court is not 
doctrinally required and thus misses the chance to ask the hard 
questions of legislative rationales. Despite importing commendable 
equality jurisprudence into copyright law, which is typically an ordinary 
economic policy matter for Congress, the Court does not go far enough 
with its anti-subordination logic.  Doing so would have exposed and thus 
more ably considered copyright law not only as market regulation 
producing economic chits and fungible assets but as social and civil 
rights legislation generating and sustaining a public resource and 
fundamental rights. There is a reason equality law, be it based on anti-
discrimination or anti-subordination, is complex and contentious 
especially at the Supreme Court. It is rooted in deeply-felt convictions 
based on centuries of historical experience about what equal treatment 
and equal dignity means and what is required from individuals and 
government to promote both. As the Supreme Court begins to adopt 
more of this equality reasoning and history in its IP decisions, we may 
therefore see more contentious disputes reconceiving copyright, for 
example, as a feature of the new century that plays a central role 
progressing human welfare through fundamental human rights. As the 
Supreme Court has traditionally been the protector of those rights 
against the tyranny of the majority and legislative overreach, it may 
begin a closer investigation of the Constitution’s “progress” mandate in 
 
93. Abraham Drassinower, Copyright is Not About Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 108, 1120, 118-19 
(2012) (describing how copyright has a bilateral structure mirroring the correlativity of a private 
law action refuting the possibility that copyright’s public domain isn’t essential to its internal 
structure). 
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terms of the affordances of shared, networked connectivity in our 
irrevocable and bittersweet digital age. 
CONCLUSION 
The resurgence of equality concerns in Supreme Court cases about 
IP is not only because equality concerns are in the air with new civil 
rights movements driven by digital communication and activism 
gaining traction – think only of #MeToo, BlackLivesMatter, and the 
LGBTQ civil rights movement.  The rise of equality logic in Supreme 
Court cases about IP is also because IP is fundamental to and deeply 
influencing everyday life in ways unforeseen in decades past. With 
copying and sharing technology at the fingertips of anyone with a cell 
phone, the digital age has changed how IP regulation works or doesn’t 
work.  Control over IP may be more difficult, its economic significance 
arguably higher or more apparent, and the restrictions IP regulation 
affects more severe in terms of costs to consumer and access to cultural 
works and useful inventions (such as books and medicine). The digital 
age has, in fact, changed so many of our baseline expectations regarding 
resource access and allocation, community formation, membership and 
influence as well as the transparency, truthfulness and accessibility of 
information. Why should it be surprising, then, that the Supreme Court’s 
resolution of issues concerning IP not only describe economic efficiency 
and wealth accumulation as one of IP’s goals, but also the promotion of 
fairness, anti-subordination, and pluralism in a deeper analysis over the 
purpose and proper application of IP laws.94 
But the Court’s constrained economic analysis based on property 
ownership anchored in pre-digital era categories underappreciates the 
changes the digital age has wrought to authorship, creativity, and 
human flourishing that are in need of renewed legal attention. The 
Court’s narrow view of IP’s stakeholders also constrains opportunities 
to meaningfully participate in politics and society through digital 
networks and markets that might generate the democratic ideal on 
which the Court bases its reasoning.  But as Plessy came sixty years 
 
94. It is not enough to say utilitarian analysis will maximize whatever good is chosen, e.g. efficiency 
is a form of justice. “A fair price in law is not necessarily the same as an efficient or wealth 
maximizing price in economics. . . justice, fairness, equity, reasonableness, and equality are not the 
subject of mathematical calculus: they are values formed from the human experience of living in 
community with others. If such concepts . . . are simply translated into economic equivalent of 
efficiency and wealth maximization, they lose much of their social and cultural meaning.” Robin 
Paul Malloy, An Interpretive Critique of an Economic Analysis of Law 3-5 (unpublished paper) (Mar. 
2, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2572497. 
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before Brown, and with Brown came a new opportunity to pursue racial 
justice for the twentieth century, maybe at the beginning of the twenty-
first century, we are living through an IP civil rights era. Perhaps the 
transformative IP decisions are yet to come. In any case, the equality 
interests the Supreme Court debates in these IP cases highlight renewed 
and urgent concerns regarding social progress and the public good now 
that the internet age is out of its infancy. 
 
